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On the exceptional status of reportative evidentials⇤
Scott AnderBois
Brown University
Abstract One of the central questions in the study of evidentials cross-linguistically
is to what extent (and in what ways) evidentials differ across languages and across
evidence types. This paper examines one such instance of variation: the ability
for a single speaker to deny the scope of a reportative evidential, an instance of
what we dub ‘Reportative Exceptionality’ (RE). Empirically, we show that RE is
widely attested across a diverse range of reportatives. Theoretically, we propose a
pragmatic account treating RE as an instance of pragmatically-induced perspective
shift. Having done so, we propose a semantics for illocutionary evidentials on which
reportatives are given a treatment uniform to other evidence types.
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1 Introduction
Evidentials are functional morphemes which, when occurring in declarative sen-
tences, encode the information source associated with a given claim, as in (1):
(1) Tariana (Aikhenvald 2004: 2-3)
Juse
José
iRida
football
di-manika-{ /mah/nih/si/pida}-ka.
3sg-play-{vis/nonvis/infer/assum/rep}-REC.PAST
p = ‘José has played football.’
EVID = Speaker saw/heard/inferred/assumed/was told that p.
While not all authors phrase the intuition in this way, I take the ‘Baseline
Conception (BC)’ in (2) to be a fairly uncontroversial, if imprecise, pretheoretical
description of the typical use of evidential-marked declaratives:
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(2) BASELINE CONCEPTION of Evidentials:
A speaker who sincerely utters a declarative sentence pEVID with propositional
content p and an evidential of type EVID typically:
a. Performs an assertion with content p (or a modalized version thereof).
b. Conveys in some way that the speaker has EVID-type evidence that p.
As should be clear from the use of terms like ‘sincerely utter’, this definition is
of course at the level of use and is therefore a characterization of the pragmatics of
evidentials. However, the question naturally arises of what parts of this picture are
conventionally encoded (i.e. are semantic). More specifically, to what extent does
the contribution of evidentials within and across languages match the Baseline Con-
ception? This paper examines what we will show to be a systematic counterexample
to the BC: the exceptional status of reportatives.
The exception: The first part of the Baseline Conception, (2a), leads us to expect
that it should be infelicitous for a speaker to deny p immediately after uttering an
evidential-marked sentence pEVID. As first discussed in detail by Faller (2002) for
Cuzco Quechua, this expectation is not upheld, an instance of what we will call
‘Reportative Exceptionality’ (RE).
(3) Cuzco Quechua (Faller 2002: 191)
a. Pay-kuna- s
(s)he-PL-REP
ñoqa-man-qa
I-ILLA-TOP
qulqi-ta
money-ACC
muntu-ntin-pi
lot-INCL-LOC
saqiy-wa-n
leave-1O-3
p = ‘They leave me a lot of money’
EVID = Speaker was told that p.
b. mana-má
not-IMPR
riki
right
riku-sqa-yki
see-PP-2
ni
not
un
one
sol-ta
sol-ACC
centavo-ta-pis
cent-ACC-ADD
saqi-sha-wa-n-chu.
leave-PROG-1O-3-NEG
q = ‘(but) that’s not true, as you have seen, they don’t leave me one sol,
not one cent.’
EVID1 = Speaker has direct evidence that q.
Addressing the exception: Faller (2002) and previous authors who have pro-
vided accounts of such data have been unanimous in building this exceptional status
into the semantics of the REPORTATIVE, thereby denying that REPORTATIVES fit (2)
even at the level of compositional semantics. For example, Faller (2002) claims p is
not asserted in (3a), but merely ‘presented’, in contrast to other evidentials in the
language.
1 Faller argues that sentences in Cuzco Quechua without an overt evidential implicate that the speaker
has direct evidence. The evidence for q in this example, then, has a different status than the evidence
for p.
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In this paper, we argue that, contrary to suggestions in prior literature, the
potential for examples analogous to (3) is extremely widespread cross-linguistically,
extending across languages whose reportatives and evidential systems more generally
differ in numerous other ways (N.B. this is not to say that such cases are typical or
frequent in any language). Given this more uniform empirical picture, we propose a
pragmatic account of (3) and similar data cross-linguistically as case of pragmatic
perspective shift, drawing on Harris & Potts’s (2009) account of the perspectival
orientation of expressives and appositives in English. Such perspective shift arises
only in reportatives since they introduce another perspectival agent, whereas other
evidentials do not. Beyond explaining why only reportatives are exceptional in this
way, the proposal explains the forms that denials like (3b) typically take. Finally,
having argued that RE is pragmatic in nature, we provide a unified account of the
meaning of REPORTATIVE, DIRECT, and ABDUCTIVE INFERENTIAL illocutionary
evidentials in declaratives.
2 Reportative exceptionality
2.1 Typology of evidentials
Before examining reportative exceptionality in detail, we first provide a bit of context
regarding the landscape of evidentiality more generally. The most common typology
of evidentials is due to Willett (1988), who distinguishes the types of information
source encoded by evidentials cross-linguistically as in (4).
(4) Willett’s (1988) typology of evidentials
Types of Evidence
Direct Attested
Visual
Auditory
Other sensory
Indirect
Reported
Secondhand
Thirdhand
Folklore
Inferring
Results
Reasoning
While much of the literature on evidentials stress that they convey information
source and not certainty, there nonetheless exist intuitive relationships between the
two. If someone tells me that it is raining, but my direct visual evidence contradicts
this, I will presumably trust my direct visual evidence over this secondhand report,
no matter how trustworthy I find the reporter to typically be. Indeed, Faller (2012)
argues for Cuzco Quechua that a quantity implicature-like inference can arise in
certain cases where a speaker uses the reportative -si in place of the intuitively
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stronger direct competitor, -mi. Finally, it has been suggested by various authors
that there exist universal hierarchies of evidential strength on which reportatives are
lowest (Attested > Inferring > Reported).
Could it be then that reportative exceptionality stems from reportative evidence
being in some sense ‘weaker’ than other kinds of evidence? In a word, no. First, other
authors including Willett (1988) have proposed conflicting scales where reportatives
are not the weakest (Attested > Reported > Inferring). Second, these scales have
been proposed primarily based on the metalinguistic intuitions of native speakers and
linguists, rather than grammatical evidence. The implicatures discussed by Faller
(2012) might provide empirical support the existence for two subscales (Direct >
Reported and Direct > Inferring), but give no evidence for any relative ordering
between Reported and Inferring evidentials. Finally, Faller (2002: §2.4) argues
persuasively against any fixed ordering, noting that context and the propositional
content of the scope proposition determine what information source is ‘strongest’.
One very clear kind of evidence for this are propositions whose content concerns the
internal mental states of others, such as p = ‘Maribel wants to go to São Paulo this
summer.’. Here, it seems clear that a report from Maribel (or even some third party)
will be an intuitively ‘stronger’ information source for p than direct visual evidence
of Maribel’s mental state possibly could be.2
We conclude, therefore, that to the extent that there even exist fixed ‘strength’
relationships between different evidentials, there is no reason to think that reportative
exceptionality can be do to the inherent ‘weakness’ of reportative information
sources.
2.2 The exceptional status of reportatives
Having placed reportatives within the larger typology of evidentials, we turn now
to examining the exceptional status of reportative evidentials. As noted in the
introduction, the Baseline Conception in (2) holds that the ‘scope proposition’ p is
asserted. Given this, we expect that an utterance of the form ‘pEVID and ¬p(DIR)’
should be infelicitous,3 just like non-evidential utterances of ‘p and ¬p’. Moreover,
we predict that this should be so regardless of what values EVID takes here and
whether or not they include a possibility or necessity modal.
2 Given this, it seems reasonable to question whether even the two subscales mentioned above are
empirically warranted or if such scales instead emerge from case-by-case reasoning about what kinds
of evidence would be strongest for a given proposition in a given context.
3 The parentheses indicate that variability in whether or not an overt evidential is needed in the second
conjunct. Related to this concern is the question of whether sentences with no overt evidential have
a phonetically null DIRECT evidential, conversationally implicate a DIRECT evidential value, or
neither. We set this aside here since they run equally afoul of the BC.
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Contrary to this expectation, however, we consistently can find examples of the
form ‘pREP and ¬p(DIR)’ across languages. We present a couple such examples here
and refer the reader to the Appendix for further such examples from more than 20
languages.
(5) Chol (Juan Jesús Vázquez Álvarez (p.c.))
am- = bi
E-B3=REP
juñ-tyiki
one-CL
mach-bä
NEG=REL
ba’
where
añ- 
E-B3
tyi
PRFV
pul-i- ,
burn-IV-B3
jiñ-jach
PRON3=only
che’
that
mach
NEG
melel,
true
tsä’-äch
PRFV=AFFR
lu’
all
pul-i-y-ob.
burn-IV-EP-PL3
‘It is said that there was one (person in the airplane) that didn’t burn up, but
it’s not true, they all burned.’
(6) Estonian (Mark Norris (p.c.))
Ta
he
küll
surely
ole -vat
be-REP
aus
honest
mees,
man
aga
but
ta
he
ei
NEG
ole
be
üldse
at.all
aus.
honest
‘It’s certainly been said that he is an honest man, but he’s not honest at all.’
(7) Finnish (Lauri Karttunen (p.c.))
Liisa
Liz
on
is
kuulemma
REP
jo
already
lähtenyt,
left
mutta
but
en
not
usko
believe
näin
like.this
‘I’ve heard that Liz has already left, but I don’t believe it.’
(8) Tagalog (Schwager 2010: 237)
Dadating
will.come
daw
REP
siya
he
sa
in
isang
one
oras,
hour
pero
but
hindi
not
talaga.
really
‘He says he will come in an hour, but in fact he won’t.’
Before continuing, we must note that there is one putative exception to the pattern
discussed here: Matthewson, Davis & Rullman’s (2007) work on St’át’imcets. We
examine the data from St’át’imcets and two other languages of the Pacific Northwest
in detail in §3.4, but mention it here since this data has led previous authors to regard
RE as a point of significant cross-linguistic variation in reportatives.4
Beyond being attested in a fairly large number of unrelated languages across
different linguistic areas, examples of this sort are found across languages whose
reportatives differ in a great many different ways, outlined in Table 1. Of particular
interest is that such examples are robustly attested even in languages where they
have been analyzed as epistemic modals. Following Matthewson et al. (2007),
4 Krawczyk (2012: 90) provides an especially clear statement of this claim, claiming a ‘Taxonomy
of Reportative Evidentiality’ whose primary division is between those languages where reporta-
tives are ‘exceptional’ in our terms and those where they require speaker commitment. Alongside
St’át’imcets, Krawczyk mentions only German, despite the examples discussed by Mortelmans
(2000) and Schenner (2010).
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REPORTATIVE is part of larger evidential paradigm?
Yes Central Alaskan Yup’ik, Cheyenne, Cuzco Quechua
No Chol, Dutch, German, Russian, Tagalog, Tojolab’al
REPORTATIVE is analyzed as:
Epistemic Modal Bulgarian, Dutch, German, Japanese, Turkish
Illocutionary operator Central Alaskan Yup’ik, Cheyenne, Cuzco Quechua
Other Tagalog, Korean, Paraguayan Guaraní
Morphosyntactically, REPORTATIVE is described as:
Verbal affix Bulgarian, Estonian, Korean, Turkish
Clausal Clitic Chol, Cuzco Quechua, Paraguayan Guaraní, Tojolab’al
Auxiliary German, Dutch
Particle Finnish, Russian, Tagalog
REPORTATIVE must take widest scope?
Yes Central Alaskan Yup’ik, Cheyenne, Chol, Cuzco Quechua
No German, Japanese, Tagalog
Table 1 Diversity of reportatives allowing denials
recent literature has taken the potential for RE to be a property of a certain type
of evidential. The pervasiveness of RE across different sorts of languages seen
here, however, seems most consistent with a view of RE as an extremely robust
cross-linguistic pattern, rather than one limited to reportatives of a particular kind.5
In contrast to reportatives, other evidentials – both direct and indirect – are
consistently infelicitous in parallel examples even within these same languages. We
might be tempted to think of the infelicity of parallel examples with direct evidentials
as in (9) as being a reflex of the apparent certainty of direct evidence. However,
no such explanation is tenable for other sorts of evidentials such as conjecturals
and abductive inferentials, as in (10–11). It is at least as plausible in principle for a
speaker to have abductive inferential or conjectural evidence that p, yet assert ¬p,
as it would be in the case of reportatives (c.f. ‘It seems like she left, but she didn’t’).
(9) Cheyenne (Murray 2010: 54)
#É-hóta˙heva-  
3-win-DIR.3sg
Floyd
Floyd
naa
and
oha
CNTR
é-sáa-hóta˙hévá-he- .
3-neg-win-MODa-DIR
‘Floyd won, I’m sure, but I’m certain he didn’t.’
5 Conversely, it should be noted that given the pragmatic account of RE we propose in §3, the existence
of such data does not give any clear argument for or against a modal analysis for these languages.
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(10) Cuzco Quechua (Faller 2002: 163)
#Llave-qa
key-TOP
muchila-y-pi= chá
bag-1-LOC-CONJ
ka-sha-n
be-PROG-3
ichaqa
but
mana-n
not-DIR
aqhay-pi-chu.
there-LOC-NEG
#‘The keys maybe/are possibly/probably in my backpack, but they are not
there.’
(11) Central Alaskan Yup’ik (Krawczyk 2012: 22)
#Aya-llru- llini -uq,
leave-PAST-INFER-IND.3SG
. . .
. . .
aya-ksaite-llru-yuk-aa.
leave-NEG-PAST-think-IND.1SGs.3SGo
#‘Evidently she left . . . [but] I don’t think that she left.’
In summary, we find that cross-linguistically it is (at least) nearly universal that
an evidential-marked claim can be felicitously denied by the same speaker only if its
evidence type is reportative.
2.3 Semantic accounts of reportative exceptionality
While the cross-linguistic systematicity of RE has gone unrecognized, there are
several accounts of RE within particular languages. Common to all of these accounts
is that they treat RE as part of the conventional contribution of the reportative
morpheme, i.e. its compositional semantics.
The earliest such account is Faller’s (2002) account of the Cuzco Quechua
reportative -si. Faller’s (2002) approach to evidentials in general is to claim that all
evidentials in the language are speech act modifiers (i.e. functions from speech acts
to speech acts). For the reportative -si, Faller (2002) proposes the function in (12) as
its conventional contribution. The input, on the left side, is what Faller takes to be
the contribution of an ordinary (i.e. non-evidential) assertion. The output, on the
right side, is the contribution of the reportative-marked assertion.
(12) Faller’s (2002) semantics for Cuzco Quechua -si:
ASSERT(p) ! PRESENT(p)SINC= {Bel(s, p)} SINC= {9s2[ASSERT(s2, p)^ s2 /2 {h,s}]
This function, then, contributes two things. First, it replaces the default sincerity
condition that the speaker believes that p to one where someone else has asserted
that p. Second, it changes the essential condition of the speech from an assertion to
a new speech act, which Faller dubs a ‘Presentation’. The first component encodes
the information source as being reportative while capturing the fact that it is separate
from the main propositional content. This part of the reportative’s meaning is
roughly parallel to other evidentials, differing only in the type of information source
referred to. The second part, however, is where the exceptional status of reportatives
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is located, since the speaker merely presents the content of the report rather than
asserting it.
Murray (2010) makes use of an update semantics which allows for a compo-
sitional account of the roles of declarative/interrogative mood and evidentials in
producing a particular series of updates. While this approach builds on Faller’s in
many important ways, the account of RE is essentially the same. The reportative’s
conventional contribution creates an update proposing “to take note of the at-issue
proposition, . . . but for the common ground to remain unchanged”. While it is not
a priori implausible that RE would be semantic in nature, its pervasiveness across
reportatives whose semantics differ in various other ways suggests that we might
hope to derive it from more general pragmatic principles.
3 A pragmatic alternative
In this section, we develop a pragmatic account of RE based on the notion of
pragmatic perspective shift of the sort proposed by Harris & Potts (2009) to account
for non-speaker-orientation of English appositives and expressive epithets.
3.1 Pragmatic perspective shift
It is, of course, well known that material in the complement of attitude verbs like
English think and believe is ordinarily attributed to the subject of that verb. For
example, Mary’s being an alien in (13) is attributed to John, not the speaker.6
(13) John thinks that Mary is an alien.
Certain kinds of semantic content, however, have been claimed to be invariably
attributed to the speaker, even in attitudinal complements. For example, Potts 2005
(and references therein) proposes a semantics where appositive relative clauses and
expressive epithets are uniformly speaker-oriented:
(14) I disagree with the expert who advised the Carnegie family that the father,
who is not the breadwinner, does not need life insurance. (COCA, Davies
2008-)
While such speaker-orientation is typical of appositives and expressives, subse-
quent authors have claimed that non-speaker-orientation is in fact possible. Consider,
for example, the following examples from Amaral, Roberts & Smith 2007. Given
that the speaker in (15) has distanced herself from the whole of Joan’s story, it is
6 One well-known exception, of course, is the descriptive content of de re attitude reports. See Faller
(2002: §6.3.5) for discussion of parallel data with reportative evidentials.
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quite clear that it can only be Joan and not the speaker who has opinions about the
installation date of the brain chip.
(15) Joan is crazy. She’s hallucinating that some geniuses in Silicon Valley have
invented a new brain chip that’s been installed in her left temporal lobe and
permits her to speak any of a number of languages she’s never studied. She
believes that, thoughtfully, they installed a USB port behind her left ear, so
the chip can be updated as new languages are available. Joan believes that
her chip, which she had installed last month, has a twelve year guarantee.
Rather than arguing against a speaker-oriented semantics, Harris & Potts (2009)
argue that these examples are due to pragmatically-driven perspective shift. The
clearest support for this claim is that non-speaker-orientation is possible even in
unembedded cases, provided that the environment is ‘perspectivally-rich’.
(16) I was struck by the willingness of almost everybody in the room – the senators
as eagerly as the witnesses – to exchange their civil liberties for an illusory
state of perfect security. They seemed to think that democracy was just a
fancy word for corporate capitalism, and that the society would be a lot better
off if it stopped its futile and unremunerative dithering about constitutional
rights. Why humor people, especially poor people, by listening to their
idiotic theories of social justice? (Lewis Lapham, Harper’s Magazine, July 1995)
They show through experimental and corpus work that the salience of an-
other perspectival agent in the context is the key factor allowing for non-speaker-
orientation of appositives and expressives, rather than any particular syntactic con-
figuration. They do find that being embedded under a third-person attitude verb
helps (indirectly) promote non-speaker-orientation as well, since it brings to salience
the attitudinal subject’s perspective. However, such embedding is neither necessary
nor sufficient for non-speaker-oriented interpretations to arise. Summing up, we
conclude that certain kinds of otherwise speaker-oriented content can be attributed
to other perspectival agents in ‘perspectivally-rich’ contexts.
3.2 Reportative exceptionality as perspective shift
In this section, we argue that RE as in (17) arises from a pragmatic perspective shift
of the same sort.
(17) Cheyenne (Murray 2010: 58)
É-hóta˙heva- se˙stse
3-win-REP.3sg
Floyd
Floyd
naa
and
oha
CNTR
é-sáa-hóta˙hévá-he- .
3-neg-win-MODa-DIR
‘Floyd won, I hear, but I’m certain he didn’t.’
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In line with the Baseline Conception, we assume that the conventionally encoded
discourse effect of the reportative-marked clause in (17) is as follows:7
(18) a. Speaker asserts (in some sense) that p
b. Speaker conveys that their evidence for p is what someone else has told
them
However, the second part of the conventional contribution of the reportative,
(18b), makes salient a non-speaker perspective: that of the reporter. This, in com-
bination with a sufficiently rich context, allows (18a) to be attributed not to the
reporter rather than the speaker, just as Joan’s chip installation date is attributed to a
non-speaker perspective in (15). We use the term ‘context’ here in the broadest sense,
including world knowledge about the speaker’s beliefs, the speaker’s presumptions
about the hearer’s perspective on these, as well knowledge about the perspective of
the contextually salient reporter including his/her reliability.
Crucial to establishing such context in many of the attested examples is the
presence of other linguistic elements which serve to make the disconnect between
the speaker’s perspective and the reporter’s publicly clear. Specifically, we observe
that the denials in examples in (5-8) (and similar examples in the Appendix) typically
make use of words translatable with English really, actually, or true, first person
attitude reports, negative polarity items, and other kinds of evaluative language. This
pattern is expected under the pragmatic view we have proposed here. As Harris &
Potts (2009) discuss for appositives and expressives, perspective shift of this sort
is a risky communicative strategy since the addressee may fail to understand the
speaker’s intended shift. The use of evaluative and other perspectival language in
the denials mitigates this risk.
In contrast, if lack of speaker commitment were simply part of the semantics,
bare denials ought to be perfectly natural, as they are with embedding verbs like say
and hear. While we do not have access to systematic data of this sort, we note that
nearly all attested examples have such elements, regardless of whether they were
the result of elicitation, introspection, or natural speech. Furthermore, Mortelmans’s
(2000) corpus study of German sollen claims that speaker skepticism must be overtly
marked, but that “this possibility is in practice not very frequently made use of”.
Finally, Koring (2013) reports the following contrast for Dutch schijnen:
(19) a. Dutch (Koring 2013: 50)
#Anneloes
Anneloes
schijnt
seems
thuis
home
te
to
zijn,
be
maar
but
dat
that
is
is
niet
not
zo.
so
‘Anneloes is said to be at home, but she’s not.’
7 We will refine this characterization somewhat in §4, in particular about the question of what we mean
by the willfully vague “assert in some sense” here.
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b. Dutch (Koring 2013: 49)
Anneloes
Anneloes
schijnt
seems
thuis
home
te
to
zijn,
be
maar
but
ik
I
geloof
believe
er
there
niets
nothing
van.
of
‘I’ve heard that Anneloes is at home, but I don’t believe it.’
One further such aspect of the form denials take which is worth considering is
their prosody. Previous literature does not report such information consistently, but
we do find claims in several languages that prosody can play an important role in
distancing the speaker’s perspective from that of the reporter. For example, Schwager
(2010) claims that when the Tagalog reportative daw is stressed, “the neutral report
is lost and the speaker expresses doubt as to the truth of the prejacent”. Valenzuela
(2003) similarly claims for the Shipibo-Konibo reportative -ronki that “sarcastic”
denials of the reportative proposition are possible with “marked intonation” among
other means.
While denials are consistently possible given sufficient evaluative language and
context, we must also stress that in the absence of such rich context, reportatives are
typically used in apparently veridical ways.8 Faller (2007) discusses this at length for
the Cuzco Quechua reportative -si, exemplified in (20). The speaker’s commitment,
of course, may still be weaker than if she had personally witnessed the blood going
to Lima, but the speaker nonetheless does not show any sign of doubting the reporter
and indeed the purpose of the utterance in the discourse is simply to add more detail
about the sick individual’s status.
(20) Cuzco Quechua (Faller 2007: 6)
a. Qusqu-pi
Cuzco-LOC
hospital-pi
hospital-LOC
ka-sha-n
be-PROG-3
. . .
‘She is in Cuzco in [the] hospital . . . ’
b. Lima-man-raq- si
Lima-ILLA-CONT-REP
yawar-ni-n-pis
blood-EUPH-3-ADD
ri-n.
go-3
‘Her blood even went to Lima.’
In this section, we have argued that the deniability of reportative evidentials
is due not to an exceptional conventional semantic contribution, but to pragmatic
perspective shift. Beyond explaining the forms that denials take, this approach
explains why reportatives allow for this possibility but other evidentials do not. At
the same time, since the reportative does not play a compositional role in the account
(but only contributes indirectly by raising the salience of the reporter), we might
8 It should be noted that some languages do additionally have morphemes/constructions which indicate
a reportative information source and appear to encode the speaker’s doubt (e.g., Finnish muka, the
so-called ‘dubitative’ in Bulgarian). We leave investigation of such elements to future work.
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worry that the account would predict that we should indeed find denials with other
evidentials given a rich enough context. However, while this may be so in principle,
it is important to note that all other evidentials besides reportatives do not simply
lack a perspectival agent, but in fact explicitly invoke the perspective of the speaker.
For example, an ABDUCTIVE INFERENTIAL evidential specifically references the
inferences and perceptions of speaker (similarly for DIRECT and CONJECTURAL
evidentials). Drawing again on the parallel with appositives and expressives, non-
reportative evidentials are akin to instances of these elements within the scope of a
first-person attitude report, and therefore ought to be quite resistant to perspective
shift.
3.3 Evidence from Bulgarian and Turkish
Thus far, we have considered evidentials whose use is limited exclusively to contexts
where the information source is reportative. In some languages, however, a single
evidential form is used for both reportative and abductive inferential information
sources, as illustrated in (21-22) for the evidential perfects in Bulgarian and Turkish,
respectively.
(21) Bulgarian (Smirnova 2013: 2)
Maria
Maria
svirela
play.INDIR
na
on
piano.
piano
‘Maria plays the piano, [I heard/inferred].’
a. 4 Reportative context: You and your sister were out of touch for a couple
of years. Today she calls you on the phone to catch up. She tells you
that her daughter Maria plays the piano. Later, you tell your husband.
b. 4 Inferential context: You and your sister were out of touch for a couple
of years. Today you visit her for the first time. As she shows you
around her apartment, you see that there is a piano in her daughter
Maria’s room. You infer that Maria plays the piano. Later, you tell your
husband.
(22) Turkish (S¸ener 2011: 12)
Usain
Usain
bolt
Bolt
kos¸-mus¸.
run-INDIR
‘It was reported to the speaker that/speaker inferred that Usain Bolt ran.’
a. 4 Reportative context: The news on TV relating to the Beijing Olympics
report Usain Bolt’s run (i.e. information gained through third parties).
b. 4 Inferential context: Usain Bolt is giving a TV interview, all sweaty
and tired right after he runs the 100 meter race. The speaker infers what
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the proposition is describing from the observable evidence, which is
Usain Bolt looking tired.
Under the pragmatic account we have proposed, then, the prediction for denials
with these forms are quite clear. In contexts which make salient a reportative
information source – and therefore an alternative perspective – denials should be
possible (given sufficient perspectival language). In contexts which make salient only
an inferential information source, denials should not be possible since no alternative
perspective is salient. These predictions are borne out, as shown by and Smirnova
(2013) for Bulgarian and S¸ener (2011) for Turkish:
(23) Bulgarian (Smirnova 2013: 29, 34)
a. 4 Reportative context: Your best friend, Ivan, has to work hard to sup-
port his family. His wealthy uncle died but did not leave him any money.
When you speak on the phone with your former classmate, she tells you
that Ivan had inherited millions from his uncle. You know that this is
not true:
Ostavil
leave.INDIR
mu
him
milioni!
millions
Ta
EMPH
toj
he
puknata
crunched
stotinka
cent
ne
NOT
mu
him
e
be.3sg.PRES
ostavil.
leave.PERF.PLE
‘He left him millions, [I hear]! He didn’t leave him a red cent.’
b. # Abductive inferential context: When you discovered a chapter of an
unauthored manuscript in Maria’s study, you inferred that Maria is
writing a book. Later you learned that it is Maria’s sister who is writing
the book. When one of your friends asks you what Maria does, you say:
#Maria
Maria
pišela
write.INDIR
kniga.
book
Vsaˇštnost,
in.fact
tova
it
ne
NOT
e
be.3sg.PRES
taka.
so
‘#Maria is writing a book, [I inferred]. In fact, it is not true.’
(24) Turkish (S¸ener 2011: 98)
Sinan
Sinan
bisiklet-ten
bike-ABL
düs¸- müs¸
fall-INDIR
ama
but
gerçekte
actually
öyle
like
birs¸ey
nothing
yok.
exists
‘It is reported to the speaker that Sinan fell off the bike, but in fact nothing
like that happened.’
a. 4 Reportative context: Seda tells Ays¸e (the speaker) that Sinan fell off
the bike.
b. # Abductive inferential context: Seda sees Sinan getting up from the
ground with his bike and his backpack spread around. Although Seda
hasn’t see Sinan fall, she infers that he has fallen off the bike.
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While such data are expected on our pragmatic account of RE, a semantic
account, it seems, must instead posit an otherwise covert ambiguity (as Smirnova
(2013) and S¸ener (2011) do for Bulgarian and Turkish respectively). Beyond being
less parsimonious, such an approach again begs the question of why the reportative
allows for denials while the abductive inferential does not.
3.4 Are there really any counterexamples?
As noted in §2.2, previous literature has regarded RE as a parameter of cross-
linguistic variation rather than a consistent pattern. The main reasons for this are
claims that have been made for three languages of the Pacific Northwest: St’át’imcets
(Matthewson et al. 2007), Gitksan (Peterson 2010), and Nuu-chah-nulth (Waldie,
Peterson, Rullmann & Mackie 2009). In particular, these authors claim that repor-
tatives in these languages do commit the speaker to at least the possibility that the
scope proposition holds, i.e. that reportatives in these languages do not violate the
baseline conception semantically or pragmatically. On closer inspection, however,
there is reason to doubt that these languages are in fact exceptions to the robust
cross-linguistic pattern shown in §2.2.
First, these authors make clear that they are in fact testing a subtly different
hypothesis than the one considered here: whether it is infelicitous for a speaker to
assert pREP if s/he knows p is false. Denials of the sort in (5-8) are regarded as
particular instances of this larger pattern, but many of the examples given by these
authors, as in (25), differ from the cases we have seen above:
(25) Gitksan (Peterson 2010: 127)
Context: You know John was at work yesterday [It is apparently known that
John cans fish for fun when not at work rather than that he works in a fish
cannery].
#si-hon= gat =it
CAUS-fish=REP=PND
John
John
k’yoots.
yesterday
‘[I heard] John canned fish yesterday.’
Unlike (5-8), no perspectivally-rich environment is established in the context
and nothing in the utterance serves to differentiate the speaker’s perspective from
the reporter’s. In particular, the speaker’s private knowledge/belief regarding p (as
stated in the context) ought to play no role unless there is reason to believe that this
knowledge is somehow publicly available. Such examples are in fact expected under
the pragmatic account given here and therefore do not give evidence supporting
the claim of cross-linguistic variation. Only in St’át’imcets do we in fact find an
infelicitous utterance of the form ‘pREP, but ¬p’ given in support of this broader
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generalization, given in (26).9
(26) St’át’imcets (Matthewson et al. 2007: 22)
Context: You had done some work for a company and they said they put
your pay, $200, in your bank account, but actually, they didn’t pay you at all.
#Um’-en-tsal-itás
give-DIR-1SG.OBJ-3PL.ERG
ku7
REP
i
DET.PL
án’was-a
two.EXIS
xetspqiqen’kst
hundred
táola,
dollar
t’u7
but
aoz
NEG
kw
DET
s-7um’-en-tsál-itas
NOM-give-DIR-1SG.OBJ-3PL.ERG
ku
DET
stam’.
what
‘#[reportedly] They gave me $200, but they didn’t give me anything.’
While further empirical work is certainly needed, there are two reasons to doubt
that this example in fact reveals a cross-linguistic difference in the semantics of
reportatives. First, nothing in the glossing of this example indicates that there is
any evaluative/perspectivally-charged language in the denial sentence. Recalling the
Dutch data in (19), then, it may simply be that (26) fails to adequately convey the
disconnect between the speaker’s and reporter’s perspectives, similar to (19a) rather
than (19b) and the other attested denials.
Second, St’át’imcets has been claimed by Lyon (2009) to (quite surprisingly)
lack perspective shift in a different case: verbal irony. Beyond noting the apparent
absence of verbal irony in texts, Lyon constructs scenarios like (27) and claims that
speakers consistently reject them in favor of more literal alternatives, e.g., ‘Here is
your thing which may or may not actually be a cup’.
(27) St’át’imcets Lyon (2009)
Context: Participant A is visiting at his friend B’s house to have coffee. B
only has one cup and one bowl. B hands A a bowl of coffee and says:
#Nilh
FOC
ti7
DEM
ti
DET
zaw’áksten-sw=a.
cup-2SG.POSS=EXIS
#‘Here’s your cup!’
It seems plausible, then, that whatever more general linguistic and/or cultural
aspects of perspective shift explain these observations might also explain the in-
felicity of (26). This is especially so since Matthewson et al. (2007) report that –
unprompted – speakers were explicitly comparing the utterance in question to a more
literal example with a lexical verb glossed as ‘say’ in place of the reportative.
To summarize, we cannot at present rule out the possbility that the reportatives
in St’át’imcets differ semantically in ways relevant for RE. However, in light of
9 Peterson (2010) purports to provide such an example for Gitksan (his example 3.63), but the example
appears to involve a lexical verb glossed as ‘hear’ without the reportative =kat appearing at all. The
infelicity of such an example is itself quite unexpected given the gloss, but in any case the example
therefore does not bear on the present issue.
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the analysis proposed here and the cross-linguistic uniformity seen outside of the
Pacific Northwest, there is ample reason to believe that either (i) examples with
more evaluative language/perspectivally rich context will reveal a greater degree
cross-linguistic uniformity than claimed in current literature, or (ii) any variation
that does exist is variation in (the use of) pragmatic perspective shift itself and not
something specific to the semantics of reportatives.
4 Illocutionary evidentials contribute asymmetric assertions
Thus far, we have argued that a variety of facts about RE cross-linguistically are best
explained under an account based on pragmatic perspective shift. Having done so, we
now revisit the question of what the semantics of reportatives looks like. In particular,
we will propose an illocutionary semantics for declaratives which is constant across
DIRECT, REPORTATIVE, and ABDUCTIVE INFERENTIAL evidentials10 and therefore
demonstrates that the exceptionality of reportatives is due to the kind of information
source they encode, rather than their compositional semantics. We focus here on so-
called “illocutionary” evidentials (see Faller 2006, Matthewson et al. 2007, Murray
2010 for discussion of these two types of evidentials) since several existing accounts
of “epistemic” evidentials such as Izvorski 1997, Matthewson et al. 2007 already do
not build RE into the reportative’s meaning.11
Since we are restricting our attention to declaratives here, our starting point is
Stalnaker’s (1978) well-known notion of Common Ground (CG). In Stalnaker’s
view, the CG is the set of propositions which “the speaker is disposed to act as if
he assumes or believes that the proposition is true, and as if he assumes or believes
that his audience assumes or believes that it is true as well”. That is, while the CG is
a basis for joint action in the conversation, it may diverge from speaker beliefs (a
point discussed far more explicitly in Stalnaker 2002).
At the same time, we do clearly nonetheless keep track of what other speakers
believe, or at least what they are publicly committed to believing. And more im-
portantly, a number of recent works, starting with Gunlogson’s (2001) analysis of
rising declaratives like It’s raining? have argued that a variety of constructions make
conventional reference to the Discourse Commitments, DCx, of each individual
speaker x, as distinct from the CG. Following these authors, then, we assume that a
discourse context determines an ordered triple as follows:
10 The analysis we propose does not extend straightforwardly to so-called ‘conjectural’ evidentials,
which show a quite different kind of exceptionality in several languages: utterances of the form
CONJ(p)^ CONJ(¬p) are felicitous, but denials with other evidentials or no evidential are not.
11 It should be noted that apparent variation in RE is one of the pieces of data used by these authors to
motivate this distinction. However, since as discussed in §2.2, denials are attested with putatively
epistemic reportatives in Bulgarian, Dutch, German, Japanese, and Turkish, it seems clear that this
data does not distinguish the two classes.
249
AnderBois
(28) Discourse components: hX ,CGX ,{DCx | x 2 X}i
While this basic setup is similar to Gunlogson 2001, Farkas & Bruce 2010 and
a number of other recent works, we differ in that we take both CGX and DCx to
be primitives. The motivation for this is to reflect the fact that given Stalnaker’s
characterization of the CG as a basis for joint action, a speaker and hearer might
well mutually decide to presume a given proposition is true and act accordingly even
if neither is entirely committed to this being so, publicly or privately.
An ordinary assertion with no evidential marking, then, targets both of these
elements. The essential effect of an assertion is to propose an update to the our shared
store of assumptions, the CG. That assertions merely propose CG updates has been
emphasized in general in a number of recent works (e.g., Groenendijk & Roelofsen
2009, Farkas & Bruce 2010) and in connection with evidentials specifically by
Murray (2010). Since DCx is individually anchored, it can be updated free of
negotiation. The resultant picture for an assertion, then, is the following:
(29) An ordinary assertion by discourse participant A with propositional content
p:
a. Adds p to DCA.
b. Proposes to add p to CG{A,B} on the basis of (29a), subject to acceptance
or denial by B.
We can call an ordinary assertion symmetrical since the propositions referred to
in (29a) and (29b) are the same. A declarative with an illocutionary evidential, we
claim, is used to make an asymmetric assertion:
(30) An evidential assertion by discourse participant Awith propositional content
p and evidence type EVID:
a. Adds EVID(p) to DCA.
b. Proposes to add p to CG{A,B} on the basis of (29a), subject to acceptance
or denial by B.
The speaker publicly commits herself to having a certain type of evidence for p,
but avoids having to make a public commitment to p itself. Although the speaker
does not publicly commit to p, the conventional effect of the evidential assertion is to
propose that the conversational participants should continue the conversation acting
as though p were true. Despite the lack of a public commitment to p, a cooperative,
rational speaker nonetheless should not make such an assertion if they believe p
to be false (i.e. proposing to add false information to the CG would violate the
Maxim of Quality). The evidential strategy is, therefore, a face-saving strategy of
sorts, allowing the speaker to avoid taking on public commitments for things other
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than their subjective information. This picture thus far is constant across evidence
types, including reportatives, where the existence of reportative evidence that p is
added to DCA and the speaker proposes to add p to the CG (recall the typical use of
reportative exemplified in (20)).
Where reportatives differ, then, is not at the level of semantics, but rather in
facilitating pragmatic perspective shift. Cases of RE, like (31), have the same
conventional contribution, but differ in that the proposal is attributed to the reporter
rather than the speaker herself, as described in (32).
(31) Cheyenne (Murray 2010: 58)
É-hóta˙heva- se˙stse
3-win-REP.3sg
Floyd
Floyd
naa
and
oha
CNTR
é-sáa-hóta˙hévá-he- .
3-neg-win-MODa-DIR
‘Floyd won, I hear, but I’m certain he didn’t.’
(32) a. Adds EVID(p) to DCA.
b. The speaker points out that the reporter would propose to add p to CG{A,B}
on the basis of (29a), subject to acceptance or denial by B.
Just as with non-speaker-oriented appositives and epithets, the content in (32b)
would – semantically – be attributed to the speaker, but given the perspectivally-rich
environment need not be. This parallel highlights the sense in which RE is a risky
communicative strategy: if the addressee fails to pick up on the speaker’s intended
perspective shift, she will take the speaker’s intent to be to add p to the CG, precisely
the opposite of what the speaker in fact intends.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have argued that the ability for a single speaker to deny the
scope of a reportative is widespread across languages, but typically makes crucial
use of evaluative and other perspectivally-charged language. Previous accounts of
this exceptional behavior for reportatives have attributed this possibility to their
compositional semantics. Given the empirical findings of the current study, we have
instead argued for an account where the potential for reportative denials arises from
the pragmatics of perspective shift. In addition to making better cross-linguistic
predictions (e.g., the behavior of indirect evidentials in Bulgarian and Turkish), the
approach provides a principled explanation for why reportatives consistently show
this behavior while other evidentials do not. The semantics of reportatives of course
still differ across languages in a great many ways which we have not accounted for
here (e.g., readings in interrogatives and imperatives, embeddability, projection).
However, we hope to have made the case that reportative exceptionality is not one
of these parameters of variation, and being due to pragmatic perspective shift, is
therefore not part of the data that semantic analyses of reportatives must account for.
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